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THE FARM POLICY DEBATE OF 1949 .. 50
PLAINS STATE REACTION TO THE BRANNAN PLAN

VIRGIL W. DEAN

A

storm of controversy arose in April 1949
when Secretary of Agriculture Charles F.
Brannan unveiled the Truman administration's
postwar policy for agriculture. The most controversial aspect of the so-called Brannan plan
was its production payments feature, a direct,
undisguised farm subsidy designed to bring relief
to producers and consumers alike. Other aspects of the complex plan also elicited both
praise and blame, but disagreements during this
fractious time were not limited to farm questions. In a year of apparent victories for the
world's communist monolith, spy trials, and
labor unrest, discussions of farm policy on the
Great Plains and elsewhere were affected by the
participants' general views of government in-

tervention in the economy and particularly by
their view of commodity stabilization as a form
of socialism.
Grassroots reaction to the Brannan plan
varied widely: some of the farmers who wrote to
Brannan praised him as a savior and the only
man in Washington who cared about their
problems; others were convinced that the villainous secretary and his contemptible plan
threatened everything that was good about
America. Theodore]. Regier, a Newton, Kansas, area farmer, encouraged the secretary to
"Keep on working" and wrote: "We want security on the farm, even if we have to control
production and have less freedom. A man in the
middle of the ocean has a world of freedom but
no security." ].]. Weber, an equally convinced
north-central Kansas wheat farmer, wrote that
as "a firm believer of supply and demand" he
opposed the Brannan plan. "[M]y farm ... is all
paid for and I do not need ... [or] want anyone
to tell me how many acres I can plant. [T]his is
suppose to be a free contry [sic] let us leave it
that way."!
In general, how did plains farmers react to
this innovative policy proposal? And why did so
many oppose what, on the surface at least,
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seemed like an extremely generous agricultural
program? Using Kansas as its primary example
and Brannan's correspondence as its primary
source, this essay offers some tentative answers
to these questions. Although scientific analysis
of this opinion (if indeed it is even possible) is
beyond the scope of this study, a sampling is
instructive. Attitudes toward Brannan's proposal came in all shades and degrees of eloquence. A look at these divergent viewpoints
can provide a window on the depth of disagreement on agricultural issues and, by implication,
a glimpse at attitudes affecting broader social
and economic issues confronting postwar Americans.
EXISTING FARM POLICY

Numerous domestic challenges confronted
the United States in the wake of the Second
World War as it sought to reconvert to a peace
time economy. Agriculture was one of the many
policy areas that demanded attention. Existing
programs were based on New Deal legislation
-most significantly, the Agricultural AdjustmentAct (AAA) of 1938-and emergency wartime legislation designed to expire at the end of
1948. Although the AAA was an omnibus
agricultural measure, its most important legacy
to the Brannan plan was the price support
system based on a certain percent of "parity" for
specified farm commodities; wheat and com
were two of the so-called "basic commodities"
on the original list, a list that grew in response
to the United States' entry into the war.
In 1941 and 1942 Congress passed legislation to encourage production of crops deemed
vital to the war effort and to guarantee farmers
some benefit from increased demand and wartime spending by supporting numerous farm
commodity prices at 90 percent of parity. By
the end of 1942, supports were guaranteed for
"basics" (wheat, com, cotton, rice, tobacco,
and peanuts) and "non-basics" (milk, butterfat,
chickens, eggs, turkeys, hogs, dry peas, soybeans
for oil, flaxseed for oil, peanuts for oil, American-Egyptian cotton, sweet potatoes, and Irish
potatoes}.2

If price supports were simply extended, many
believed the cost of the system soon would
become prohibitive, resulting in a consumer or
taxpayer revolt against the entire farm program.
Farmers' successes exacerbated the problem. In
the 1940s the nation was in the midst of what
Wayne Rasmussen calls the second agricultural
revolution-"the change from animal power to
mechanical power and the adaptation of chemistry to agricultural production." Spectacular
gains in farm productivity were already quite
evident, and price-depressing farm surpluses
loomed ever larger for the future. 3 What was to
be done? In essence, this was the core of the
postwar debate.
At issue was the "parity" concept, an idea
that gained currency in the 1920s, was codified
in the Agricultural Adjustment Acts of the
1930s, and quickly became the cornerstone of
the national farm program. The formula used to
determine the level of support was a complex
one, but, in its simplest terms, parity was the
"ratio of equality" between the prices received
by farmers for the commodities sold and the
prices farmers paid for the goods and services
they purchased. A base period, initially 190914, was selected so the ratio could be determined in light of the constant fluctuation of
prices. 4
Government price support programs based
on a given"percentage of parity were particularly
important to farmers in the wheat producing
states of the Great Plains where over-dependence on one-commodity agriculture made
producers especially vulnerable to farm price
fluctuations. Hard hit by depression and drought
in the "Dirty Thirties," plains farmers generally
appreciated New Deal programs that alleviated
their suffering; but only favorable weather and
the wartime demand of the early forties would
return good times to their region. This boom
period also brought a rapid increase in the
application of new technologies, a favorable
economic climate for stock raising, a considerable expansion of wheat acreage, a concomitant
increase in production, and an acceleration in
the trend toward fewer but larger farms. The
continuation of prosperity during the immediate
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postwar years notwithstanding, farmers feared
another depression. At the very least, they
demanded a support system that would put a
floor under certain commodity prices. s
Whether on or off the farm, virtually everyone agreed with Secretary Brannan that farmers
confronted "disadvantaging economic circumstances" because of "the serious hazards resulting from unfavorable weather, floods," and their
inability to make quick production adjustments.
Brannan, a forty-five year old attorney from
Denver, Colorado, had spent thirteen years in
the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) administering New Deal action programs before his appointment to the department's
top post in J.une 1948. 6 Experience had taught
him that peculiar circumstances entitled the
farmer to special legislative consideration and,
if necessary, assistance. In addition, like others
of his generation, Brannan held to a concept of
agrarianism that maintained "that the prosperity of our agricultural producers is closely tied up
with the prosperity of our entire country."7
Nevertheless, common ground on specific
program choices was illusive. Congressional
ineptitude in this area can be partially explained by the fact that the so-called "farm
problem" was actually a myriad of different
problems, all of which resisted comprehensive
solution. As the former chairman of the House
Committee on Agriculture, Clifford R. Hope
(R., Kans.), observed in 1949, it was, more
accurately, "thirty-five or forty farm problems."8
Hope, a widely respected congressional farm
spokesman from western Kansas, had been
searching for answers in behalf of farmers since
the 1920s, and he was well aware of the problem's
complexities. Not only did the problems differ
for farmers from one commodity to another, but
they also varied from region to region for producers of any given commodity. In addition, the
often discordant interests and opinions of processors and consumers frequently compounded
the problem and complicated the search for a
solution.
This long-standing reality was exacerbated
by the wartime legislation that had extended
high, "rigid," price support guarantees to a

FIG. 1. Republican Congressman Clifford R. Hope,
Sr. , of Garden City, addressing a meeting of the Lane
County Farm Bureau at Dighton in December of 1949.

Photograph courtesy of Kansas State Historical
Society.

laundry list of previously uncovered commodities. The issue became the extent and level of
commodity price supports, not the viability of
the concept. A few farm advocates called for
government support at 100 percent parity, but
the most common point of contention in the
postwar farm policy debate occurred between
proponents of a fixed 90 percent of parity and
those who favored a more flexible support system. The question was no longer whether or !lot
government had a role in agriculture, but what
that role would be; and "the principal question
with most farmers," wrote Congressman Hope,
"is not whether they are entitled to 90% of
parity, but the method to be used in giving it to
them."9
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising
that the Agricultural Act of 1948 (Hope-Aiken
Act), the nation's first shot at a long-range,
postwar policy for agriculture, was at best a
hybridized piece of farm legislation. Title I, the
Hope portion of the new law, simply extended
existing legislation through 1949, while Titles
II and III, named for their principal sponsor,
Senator George Aiken (R., Yt.), implemented
a long-range price support program based on a
new formula for computing parity and a plan for
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sas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas went Republican as they had in the previous election; but
President Truman held many of the midwestern
and western states that Franklin Roosevelt had
carried and recaptured Colorado, Iowa, Ohio,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming, which had gone
back to the Republicans in 1944. Truman's
surprising November victory, due in part to an
aggressive farm state campaign, left many,
including the president and the secretary of
agriculture, with the impression that the administration had received a mandate to change the
country's farm policy. II
FIG. 2. During the campaign of 1948, President
Truman made an important farm speech and appearance at the National Plowing Contest at Dexter, Iowa,
on 18 September 1948. Here the President shakes
hands with farmers Ronald H. Orr, Beatrice, Nebraska,
and Charles G. Long, Bethany, Missouri, the defending
and current plow champions. Associa ted Press
photograph courtesy of Harry S. Truman library.

a flexible or sliding scale ranging from 60 to 90
percent of parity for most major crops. According to Representative Harold Cooley, the conference committee had labored for many long
hours only to bring "forth a monstrosity." As
Stephen Pace, another Democratic opponent,
explained, "The House passed a bill, the Senate
passed a bill, and the compromise is to enact
both of them." Even Congressman Hope, who
had come early to the position that more time
was needed to study changing conditions before
permanent legislation was passed, described the
Aiken bill as "a hastily gotten up concoction,
full of contradictions and weak spotS."1O
The failings of the Republican 80th Congress, the politicization of agricultural issues in
the fall campaign, and the Democratic election
successes in 1948 made a renewed long-range
farm policy search inevitable. Not only had
Democrats recaptured majority control of the
Congress, they had reelected a president. Kan-
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Secretary Brannan interpreted and gave life
to that mandate-whether it was real or imag-

ined. On 7 April 1949 he appeared before a
joint session of the House and Senate agriculture committees to discuss some of the
administration's "views and recommendations"
with regard to price supports, "the heart of our
farm policy."12
The essence of Brannan's proposal contained
four basic elements: 1) a new standard of
support based on income rather than price
criteria, which represented "a realistic minimum below which it is not in the interest of
farmers or consumers to allow farm prices to
fall"; 2) a more recent, realistic, moving ten
year base period (initially 1939 through 1948)
for computing the new income support standard; 3) support accomplished through the use
of loans, purchase agreements, production payments, and direct purchases; and 4) eligibility
for price support limited to producers who practiced good soil conservation and did not exceed
a predetermined level ofproduction-"a volume
high enough to benefit most farms but one
which will not encourage the development of
extremely large, industrialized farming."13
Brannan's proposal was complex and many
faceted, but the new plan's most controversial
component was the secretary's scheme for offering relief to both consumers and producers.
"Non-perishable" or "storable" commodities
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were to be supported in much the same way as
they had been under existing legislation (loans,
purchase agreements, and direct purchases), but
"perishable" commodities would be supported
under a new system of "production" or "income
payments." In practice, a support standard
would be determined by the Secretary of Agriculture, and a direct payment would be made to
the producer to make up the difference between
the standard and the market price of that commodity. This was an undisguised government
subsidy to the farmer, in itself a hard pill for
many inside and outside farm circles to swallow,
and a consumer subsidy, anathema to most
conservatives.
A second.provision, which also proved quite
controversial, was designed to encourage the
"family-sized farm" by denying government support beyond a certain level of production. In an
effort to coopt those groups most likely to
oppose this particular concept, Brannan wrapped
his explanation in a cloak of American idealism
and agrarian fundamentalism. "One bulwark of
democracy," Brannan proclaimed, "may be
found in the prosperous rural community mainly
composed of economically strong families farming in the traditional American pattern. It is an
ever-present answer to communism." By limiting "eligibility for price support to a defined
volume of production on each farm," Brannan
believed the government could avoid encouraging "large, industrial farming" and still help
most farmers who were relatively small scale
producers. 14
In principle there was little new in Brannan's
proposal, but in practice the plan's emphasis
and scope were significant departures from previous programs. The new support standard was
to be used to support a much longer list of
commodities at what amounted to 100 percent
of parity. At minimum, Brannan believed his
"first-priority, or group 1" commodities should
include corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco, whole
milk, eggs, farm chickens, hogs, beef cattle, and
lambs. Other farm products would receive
commensurate support if funds were available.
The secretary hoped that his plan would be the

culmination of the lengthy and often politically
explosive postwar search for a solution to the
"farm problem."15 Instead the "Brannan plan"
touched off a political firestorm.
CONGRESSMAN HOPE AND RESPONSE TO
THE BRANNAN PLAN

National reaction registered quickly. A New
York Times editorial called the administration
plan a "political maneuver," and other news
agencies claimed that its real author was the
"radical" National Farmers Union (NFU). In
addition, a steady stream of letters and telegrams began arriving at the USDA and the
White House on the day following Brannan's
committee appearance. Members of Congress
were also understandably concerned. Congressman Hope commented on the production payment feature of the proposed plan in the first
letter he wrote after Secretary Brannan's presentation: "Farmers generally," Hope believed,
would "oppose the cash subsidy plan because
they will feel there is no certainty of it being put
in operation." It would be wholly dependent on
annual appropriations and farmers would have
no way of knowing, at planting time, if payments actually would be forthcoming. "Furthermore, most farmers consider a payment of
that kind a consumer subsidy rather than a farm
subsidy." Nevertheless, Hope assured his
correspondent that the House Committee on
Agriculture would give all the secretary's recommendations careful consideration. 16
Although he later became a staunch opponent of the secretary's plan, Hope was undoubtedly sincere in his promise of objectivity. The
congressman had been disquieted by the
administration's injection of partisanship into
the farm policy debate during the previous
campaign, but he was also "terribly disappointed
in Allan Kline," the conservative, "free trade"
president of the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF). Hope believed that Kline, who
was philosophically opposed to all federal subsidies and accompanying regulations, was forcing his position on the entire organization. "It
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isn't simply a question of what the support levels
will be but it is a question of whether a little
group of leaders who are entirely out of touch
with the thinking of people on the farms are
going to dictate farm legislation." Hope was not
yet sure what should be done with regard to price
policy, "but if we are going to have all the
controls that are contained in the Aiken bill we
might just as well have 90% of parity price
supports and let the farmer be getting something
out of it."17
These words, written in "confidence" less
than two months before Brannan's policy announcement, reveal considerable common
ground between the congressman and the secretary of agriculture. Hope had previously expressed support for production payments. 18 By
1anuary 1949 he had come to the conclusion
that farmers were willing to accept more controls, although his mail was running in all
directions; he was upset with the AFBF's intransigence; and, he was definitely committed
to changing the Aiken bil1. 19 Despite the partisanship of the past campaign, Hope respected
Brannan and expressed considerable confidence in his efforts to find a solution for the
price support problem. "I know that Secretary
Brannan is giving a great deal of though[t] and
study to the matter," he wrote on 3 February,
"and that he has the best brains in the Department working on it now. I am sure he wants to
do everything possible to work out a solution to
the question."2o
This conciliatory tone notwithstanding,
within hours of the secretary's initial committee
presentation two months later, the battle lines
were drawn, and Hope was in opposition. Although the debate intensified as lawmakers and
the general public began to focus on specific
legislation, the pros and cons remained surprisingly constant. Truman and Brannan labored to
convince the nation that the Brannan plan was
not a new approach, but in many ways the
administration's proposed program was in fact a
sharp departure from previous policy.21 The
controversial "production payments" were not
new to the table, but in the Brannan plan they
were a centerpiece.

The big differences were in emphasis, unprecedented high levels of support and mandatory supports for many perishable commodities.
As Congressman Hope explained, "It is the
slant which the Secretary has put on the matter
that disturbs me."Z2 "[U]ntil Secretary Brannan
came along with his proposal," Hope reasoned,
"no one ever had any idea that payments would
be used to the extent that he suggests."23 It was
this "slant" that disturbed many and excited
others, and a number of interested Kansans took
the time to express their considered opinions,
both pro and con. These reactions ran the
gamut of public opinion and, on the whole,
fairly reflect the many different attitudes expressed throughout the region, as well as the
nation.
RESPONSES FROM KANSANS

Taking a pro-administration line, 1. A. Meyer
of Riley informed the secretary that Allan Kline
and the Farm Bureau were under the influence
of the 2 percent of big farmers "that has least to
benefit from the [new] program." Mrs. Thomas
Williams, from western Kansas, agreed: "We
have always paid Our Dues to the Farm Bureau
but cant see any benefit in it for us: the way I see
that other plan [Aiken Act?] is to help the rich
wheat farmer while it makes it harder every day
for the little man to have a lob or money to buy
his groceries .... I know all the little people are
left holding the bag again: the rich are always
protected. "24
This hostility toward the Farm Bureau, the
most influential farm organization in the state
and the nation, was also reflected in a 6 May
1949 letter to Secretary Brannan from Hiawatha
farmer Hugh Craig, who believed the Brannan
plan had the support of most dirt farmers. "It is
epochal and strikingly constructive and worthy
of a place beside President Truman's declaration of intention to fight global poverty," he
wrote. "P.S. As a member of the American
Farm Bureau Federation, I resent Allan B. Kline's
utterances." Three months later, in a letter to
former Kansas Senator Arthur Capper, who was
spending much of his first year of retirement
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service by the state to the individual and that
may entail compelling the wealthier of our
citizens to bear a greater share of the national
burden than they do now.
Craig believed the opposition's cry about "sacred property rights" was a position "worthy of
the Dark Ages" and insisted that "free lunch for
school children" carried with it just as many
"dangers of state socialism" as the farm plan
under consideration. He closed this Populistic
epistle as follows:

FIG.~ . A Nebraska native, AllanB . Kline graduated
from Iowa State College and subsequently established
himself as farmer/stockman in Benton County, Iowa.
He became active in the local Farm Bureau, served as
vice-president and president of the state federation, and
was elected president of the AFBF in 1947. Photo-

graph courtesy of Kansas Farm Bureau.

attacking the Brannan initiative, Craig asked
why the farmer should not "have a fair share of
the national income." His homey, handwritten
letter conveyed "liberal" views that nearly paralleled those of the Farmers Union. Craig
insisted that the "principle of parity" represented a "price to the farmer that would give
him approximately a fair share of the national
income," and therefore he should receive 100
percent of parity. He believed "subsidization"
had become "a cardinal principle of the Republican party," enjoyed by business through the
protective tariff for many years. 2S
"The real objection to [the] Brannan Plan
among those who are fighting it for other than
personal reasons," wrote Craig,
is because of its implications. They fear a
national policy that will adopt a broader
conception of human rights and of greater

If our wealthier people would be willing to
remedy injustice against human rights at
some expense to themselves, they would not
need ro fear radical socialism or communism,
it seems to me. By opposing doing the above,
they are inviting everything they fear.
The Republican Party is too much under
the influence of reactionary wealth and selfish commercialism. It was founded as a
liberal party and its great leader Abraham
Lincoln typified that spirit. Unless it returns
to its early principles, its days of glory are
gone and its expectancy is short. 26
Capper's rebuttal was based primarily on his
belief that it was not "healthy for the farmer, or
for the consumer, or for the country, to have the
farmer dependent upon the Federal Treasury for
his income, and the consumer dependent upon
the Federal Treasury for part of his grocery bill."
He believed "it a dangerous philosophy that
Government owes you or me a living" and that
the Federal Treasury could [not] long stand
the load of supporting any considerable group
of people in this country. In times of distress,
we may yield to necessity. But to draw upon
the Treasury to sustain the artificially high
income levels of the war and postwar years
-it just can't [and "won't"] workY
Unfortunately for the administration,
Capper's judgment mirrored more public opinion than did Craig's. Across the Plains (and
nation) many people found considerable
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relevance in the opinions expressed by the
former senator. A Chase County, Kansas,
farmer informed the secretary that everyone he
talked to opposed the Brannan plan and, although he had voted Democratic all his life, he
was making the switch. "If you want to make
regimented peasants out of the farmer," he
wrote, "every man with a backbone will be your
foe." Mrs. Morris Campbell of Lamed insisted
that "no one, but a complete moron could
believe you can have cheap food for consumers
and high prices for producers .... You men in
Washington yap about the Reds & are getting
our country the same way."28
Many other observers and participants in the
farm debate echoed similar attitudes. One
western Kansas newspaper editorialized that the
government had a role in agriculture, but "Aid
and assistance can't ... long be given without
dictation of what to do and ... when to do it. If
the administration's program gets through Congress," editor Victor C. Leiker insisted, "the
farmer of America will be the most regimented
group our country has ever seen .... If the plan
goes through it will be just another step toward
socialization. "29
THE KANSAS CONGRESSIONAL
DELEGATION

The entire Kansas congressional delegation
also espoused this attitude, opposing, without
exception, the Brannan plan. Sixth District
Representative Wint Smith of Mankato was
obsessed with "creeping socialism" and the domestic Communist threat. He disputed virtually all of the administration's foreign policy
initiatives and was "unalterably opposed to any
of the so-called Fair Deal ideas about social
legislation." The Brannan plan was just another
of these "socialistic scheme[s]," endorsed first
by organized labor "simply to get cheaper food"
at taxpayer expense. 30
Representative Hope thought "the matter
should be carefully studied in Congress" but was
"dubious about any farm plan which has to be
carried out by means of payments to producers."
The congressman was apprehensive about a

proposal that so closely resembled the British
system. "It is in effect a subsidy to the consumer," he reasoned,
and apparently in England the consumers
have gotten so fond of the subsidy that any
talk about raising prices brings a threat of a
political revolt .... The thing that bothers
me is that if we start such a program here and
consumers adjust themselves to the subsidized prices, the chances are we will never
get rid of them.
A week later Hope wrote "the Brannan plan ...
would, in my opinion, bring about a situation
very much the same as the farmers in England
are confronted with at the present time, which
is total control of their farming operations."3l
INFORMING THE FARMERS

Throughout the farm policy debate of 1949
and early 1950, Secretary Brannan repeatedly
expressed the belief that the public, especially
the farmers, would support his program if they
better understood the issue. This was an overly
optimistic assessment, but some of the secretary's
mail did reflect a degree of understandable
confusion, and there were some instances of
"conversion" that undoubtedly reinforced the
department's belief that education was the key
to success. One such "convert," D. H. Richert
of North Newton, Kansas, wrote the secretary
expressing the commonly held concern that the
new plan would lead to excessive regimentation
or government control of America's farms. In
his reply Brannan thanked Richert for this "opportunity to discuss ... the bogey of regimentation." The secretary assured his correspondent
that he "did not propose to the Congress that
farmers should be pushed around and regimented
a lot," and made some general remarks about his
recommended program. Richert was convinced;
a few days later he wrote that this was "a fine
program" and only wished "there would be some
way of bringing the truth to the farmers."32
Whether or not USDA officials were correct
in assuming that the more people knew the
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more likely they were to support the Brannan
plan, polls seemed to indicate a definite need for
more information. In late May national polls
revealed that farmers still did not fully understand the program and were not convinced of its
viability. Data also indicated that farmers were
evenly split; they were not for the sliding scale
of the Aiken Act but did not yet understand the
Brannan plan. Lester F. Kimmel, a special
correspondent for the Wichita Eagle, reported:
Surveys being made by agrarian observers
indicate that the farmer, as of now, is openminded. He is sitting back to see which party
develops the program that seems most advantageous to him .... In poker parlance the
Brannan plan sees the Republicans and raises
them in almost every particular.
The farmer was listening but had not yet reacted. 33
FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
BRANNAN PLAN

On the Great Plains, as elsewhere in the
country, the Farm Bureau, National Grange,
and conservative cooperatives were inclined
toward the Republican view. Since the Farm
Bureau was the most influential agricultural
organization in the central Plains and the corn
belt, the Republicans were in the strongest
position. Most livestock producers, fearing an
increase in feed-grain prices, also opposed the
Brannan plan. 34 But farmers and stock growers
were not known for their group loyalty, and
organizational influences also pulled them in
the other direction.
Most significant nationally, and especially
on the northern Plains, was the Farmers Union,
which gave the secretary's plan its most enthusiastic support. Brannan received many hearty
letters of endorsement from state and local
Farmers Unions throughout the country, but
they were numerous from the northern Plains
and upper Midwest-most notably the Dakotas,
Montana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan. A St. Paul union official, for example,

decried his state's Farm Bureau for "tagging all
of us as Anglophiles, [and] calling your
[Brannan's] plan the 'British' Farm Program.
We're steeping a cup of hot water in case there's
another tea party."35
Republicans, Congressman Hope included,
were understandably concerned about these
various alignments and the plan's political implications. They were especially troubled by the
active involvement of organized labor, which
was second only to the NFU in its efforts for the
Brannan proposal. "Most of the support," Hope
wrote on 4 June, "is coming from the CIO
[Congress ofIndustrial Organizations] and there
is no doubt but what it is a CIO bill from start
to finish. This very fact I am sure is going to
make most farmers suspicious." Two weeks later
he called the administration's proposal the "CIO
Plan" and criticized the "so-called Farm Conference" held by the Democrats in Des Moines
the previous week. It was "mostly a rally by the
Democrats and Labor leaders trying to get farmers to support the repeal of the Taft-Hartley bill,
and incidentally to support the Brannan Farm
Plan." Hope believed the Brannan plan, because oflabor's substantial influence, gave more
to consumers than to farmers. "I don't think,"
he wrote on 25 June, the new farm bill "should
be the Brannan bill which is a CIO program or
the Aiken bill which is too much of a United
States Chamber of Commerce program."36
DEFEAT OF THE BRANNAN PLAN

Momentarily, in late June and early July, it
appeared as if "a rather pale version of the
Brannan plan" had a real chance. The so-called
Pace-Brannan bill (H.R. 5345) provided for
Brannan's income support standard and 100
percent supports for Group 1 commodities but
limited the application of production payments
to no more than three commodities. 37 Even this
was more than most Brannan opponents could
tolerate, and they got behind Albert A. Gore,
Sr.'s (D., Tenn) one year extension of the
existing program, which passed overwhelmAll upper plains state congressmen,
ingly.
except Minnesota's, supported the Gore bill,
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FIG. 4. President Harry S. Truman signing the rural telephone bill, 28 October 1949. Secretary of Agriculture
Charles F. Brannan (third from left) looks on; as do other government officials (former secretary of agriculture and
REA Administrator Claude R. Wickard, third from right) and representatives of interested farm organizations. USDA
photograph courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library.

which was, in essence, a vote to kill the Brannan
plan. 38
The administration's proposal was indeed
dead for 1949, as it had even less support in the
Senate. But with the secretary and his supporters looking toward 1950, the fight was still
important. Proponents and opponents expected
the plan to be a major issue in the next congressional campaign. In August Hope thought the
Brannan plan was "dead for the time being,"
but, he cautioned, the GOP must be ready to
"meet it as an issue in 1950."39
Republicans had no intentions of allowing
themselves to be bushwhacked in farm states
again and launched their drive for a 1950 farm
program at a Sioux City, Iowa, farm conference
in late September 1949. Although billed as a
non-partisan conference that did include repre-

sentatives from the opposition camp, the political implications of the conference were clear.
Participants sought a GOP alternative to the
"Brannan or Bust" farm plan, but the party's
National Committee chairman insisted that
the farm problem "should not become the football of partisan politics." Conference keynoter
Clifford Hope repeated the charge that the
Brannan program was actually the plan of organized labor; that being the case, he asked, why
was it not tried on labor first? "If high incomes
and low prices are a good thing for the farmer,
why aren't high incomes and low wages a good
thing for working people?" The consumer would
benefit in many ways if government were to
adopt a "low wage policy," and "if the Brannan
plan advocates are right, workers wouldn't lose
because the Government would give them a
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check every so often to make up the difference
between actual wages and a fair wage rate to be
determined by the Government."40
Back on Capitol Hill, a bill (S. 2522) introduced by former secretary of agriculture, now
senator, Clinton P. Anderson (D., N.M.) was
gaining momentum. The AFBF had lent its
strong support to the Anderson bill largely
because it managed to incorporate the principle
of flexible supports, and Senator Aiken defended it as a strengthening of the Agricultural
Act of 1948. For the most part Congressman
Hope agreed: "It is not too different from the
Hope-Aiken bill and I think it is an improvement in some ways."41 As predicted, the Anderson bill finally passed the Senate in mid-October but the conference committee, in a manner
reminiscent of the previous year, reported a
compromise package-the Gore-Anderson bill,
which became the Agricultural Act of 1949.
The Brannan plan was dead, but high price
supports lived on, as the Gore portion of the
compromise again postponed the implementation of the sliding scale. It was, in essence, a
victory for advocates of high mandatory price
supports, southern Democrats and midwestern
and western RepublicansY
Unbeknownst to the administration and its
Republican-Dixiecrat opposition, 1949 had been
the first and last chance for the Brannan plan.
Truman and Brannan geared up for a renewed
battle for the secretary's proposal in 1950, but
other events-McCarthy ism at home and the
Korean War abroad-were to attract far more
public attention and make another change in
farm policy appear unwise. Brannan carried on
the fight, but by midyear President Truman was
fully occupied in other areas. The Brannan plan
was an issue in some congressional campaigns
that fall, but it was generally of secondary
importance. Even in Iowa, where the administration sponsored the senatorial candidacy of its
under secretary of agriculture, Albert J. Loveland,
the conservative Republican incumbent, Bourke
B. Hickenlooper, won handily.43 In Kansas,
early speculation notwithstanding, the Brannan
plan had no perceptible impact, and the Repub-

lican delegation to Congress was reelected. All
were Brannan plan antagonists. 44
SIGNIFICANCE OF FARM POLICY DEBATE,

1949-50
The farm policy debate of 1949 and 1950 did
not result in the enactment of an effective longrange program, but it is of historical significance. Certainly one cannot begin to comprehend the subsequent dialectic on farm issues
without first looking at this episode. The arguments that would dominate agricultural debate
for years to come crystalized in 1949 and 1950.
Plains state farmers who expressed support for
the Brannan plan did so because they considered the old approach wholly inadequate and
saw the administration's plan as a step toward
greater social and economic equity. Those who
opposed it did so because they feared excessive
government spending, "creeping socialism,"
and the "regimentation" of the nation's agricultural industry. Most opposed the Truman
administration's initiatives in other domestic
areas like federal housing, national health care,
and aid to education for the same reasons.
The result was a permanently refocused debate: not on whether the federal government
had a role in agriculture, but on what its role
should be. The "old liberalism," which included New Deal farm policy, had become the
"new conservatism."45 A few, like the old antiNew Deal curmudgeon Dan D. Casement of
Manhattan, Kansas, were consistent in their
opposition to all government largess and saw no
fundamental difference between the old parity
system and the Brannan plan. To this Great
Plains farmer-stockman, efforts to "walk a middle course between statism and freedom" were
"damned unrighteous."46 Most Kansans, however, had reconciled their basically conservative political ideology to the old methods of
supporting farm prices-government loans, direct purchases, acreage allotments, and marketing agreements. They were suspicious of the
Brannan plan, which meant "junking the deeply
imbedded system" that had "met with general
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favor among farmers" for "an untried one."47
They could not handle this next logical step,
which included direct payments, more limits on
production, and consumer subsidies.
Congressman Hope, for one, recognized the
inherent contradictions and, like many other
farm legislators and their constituents, remained
in a quandary with regard to the "farm problem." Hope was relatively conservative on most
issues but had supported the principles of New
Deal farm legislation. Although philosophically opposed to government interference in the
marketplace, he came to accept the necessity of
government price supports for agricultural commodities. In this respect, Hope reflected a
general GOP dilemma. His was a pragmatic
position dictated by the realization that farmers
had been unable to solve the "farm problem" on
their own. Some type of federal support system
seemed the only way to compensate for
agriculture's inherently unequal competitive
position in relationship to the nonfarm sector of
the economy.48
One. can at least speculate that the majority
of Hope's constituents, like people throughout
the region, found themselves in a very similar
political and philosophical quandary. Their
opposition to the Brannan plan was an expression of their philosophy; their continued acceptance of the established farm support program
was an exercise in pragmatism. Not surprisingly, the search for an effective long-range
policy for agriculture, like the nation's struggle
to come to grips with many of its social ills, has
been continually frustrated.
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